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1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
2. Justice O’Connor’s description of the facts in her dissenting opinion were undisputed:
Christopher Simmons’ murder of Shirley Crook was premeditated, wanton, and
cruel in the extreme.  Well before he committed this crime, Simmons declared that
he wanted to kill someone.  On several occasions, he discussed with two friends
(ages 15 and 16) his plan to burglarize a house and to murder the victim by tying
the victim up and pushing him from a bridge.  Simmons said they could “‘get
away with it’” because they were minors.  In accord with this plan, Simmons and
his 15-year-old accomplice broke into Mrs. Crook’s home in the middle of the
night, forced her from her bed, bound her, and drove her to a state park. There,
they walked her to a railroad trestle spanning a river, “hog-tied” her with electrical
cable, bound her face completely with duct tape, and pushed her, still alive, from
the trestle.  She drowned in the water below.
Id. at 600 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
3. 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion).  
4. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563.
5. Id. at 564.
6. Id. at 564-65.
7. Id. at 566.
809
TRADITION & THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT FOR JUVENILE CRIME
HARRY F. TEPKER*
In March of 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in Roper
v. Simmons.1  The case arose from the brutal,  horrific, and depraved murder
of a defenseless elderly woman.2  The Court reviewed the case and its prior
decision in Stanford v. Kentucky.3  A bare majority of the Court held that the
constitutional ban of “cruel and unusual punishments” barred execution of
offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were
committed.  The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Kennedy, made three
basic points.
First, there is a national “consensus” for the conclusion that the juvenile
death penalty offends “evolving standards of decency.”4  A majority of states
do not allow such executions.5  In states where such executions are possible,
they are extremely rare.6  And there is consistency in the “trend” toward
abolition of the practice.7  Second, this consensus reflects a view that
juveniles, like the mentally retarded, are “categorically less culpable than the
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8. Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
9. Id. at 578.
10. Id. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 608, 616 n.8, 626-27.
12. Id. at 608, 615.
13. Id. at 616 n.8.
14. George F. Will, Wrong on All Counts, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at B7.
15. Bruce Fein, The Lesson of Justice Kennedy, LICHFIELD GROUP, Mar. 5, 2005, http://
www.thelichfieldgroup.com/pubs/2005/03/kennedy/.
16. Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9,
2005, at A3.
average criminal.”8  Finally, the overwhelming weight of international opinion
against the juvenile death penalty confirms the Court’s own determination that
the penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under the age of
eighteen.9 
Justice Scalia dissented.10  In many ways, it is a joy to teach constitutional
law while he serves on the Court.  He writes so well and his arguments,
particularly in dissents, are always thought-provoking and forceful.  But he
often serves his cause badly by being too forceful for his own reputation.  His
dissent in Roper was particularly vehement and personal in tone.  He decried
his colleague Kennedy’s opinion as “a mockery,” “implausible,” resting “on
the flimsiest of grounds,” “indefensible,” “sophistry,” and undemocratic.11  In
rationale and result, Scalia claimed that the decision was a “usurpation of the
role of moral arbiter,” based only on “the subjective views of five Members
of this Court and like-minded foreigners.”12  He even condemned Justice
O’Connor’s analysis — in dissent — as both unpredictable and undemocratic
because she endorsed almost all of the majority’s methodology even as she
also reached Scalia’s conclusion.13
As if on cue, a tsunami of denunciation followed.  George F. Will assailed
Justice Kennedy as “a would-be legislator, a dilettante sociologist and a free-
lance moralist, disguised as a judge.”14  Bruce Fein wrote that Justice Kennedy
was guilty of preposterous sermonizing, a “squeamish moral conscience,”
“foolish” beliefs, insufficient horror of brutal murders, an obtuse insistence
on relying on the “opinion of the world community,” “fuzzy” and
“undisciplined” thinking, and — perhaps worst of all — “repudiat[ing] Scalia
in all his moods and tenses.”15  Phyllis Schlafly and Oklahoma’s own U.S.
Senator Tom Coburn suggested that Justice Kennedy’s invocation of foreign
legal authority is grounds for impeachment, because his research methods
don’t meet the standards of “good behavior” prescribed for judges by the
Constitution.16
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17. Tom Parker, Alabama Justices Surrender to Judicial Activism, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan.
1, 2005, at 4B.
18. Id.
19. Milbank, supra note 16 (“The full Stalin quote . . . is ‘Death solves all problems: no
man, no problem.’”).
20. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 665 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Alden as a “judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . defined only by the present
majority’s perception of constitutional penumbras rather than constitutional text”).
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. Jeffrey Rosen, Court Outsourcing: Juvenile Logic, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 2005, at
On New Year’s Day 2006, an associate justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court condemned his colleagues for complying with Roper.17  He advocated
judicial disobedience of a decision he characterized as an act of blatant
judicial tyranny because, he claimed, the Justices based their ruling not on the
original intent or actual language of the United States Constitution but on
foreign law, including United Nations treaties.18 
The assault on the judiciary eventually turned from witty barbs and fair
comment to something darker and more foreboding.  At a Washington, D.C.
conference,  Dr. Edwin Vieria offered a recommendation to conservative
activists, quoting Stalin: “No man, no problem.”19  Presumably, Vieria too was
committed only to impeachment and removal, not something more violent.
Yet, when so-called conservatives start quoting the darkest words of Joseph
Stalin about appropriate political tactics, we all should dare to question what
is truly conservative.
One would have thought from all this uproar that the decision in Roper v.
Simmons signaled judicial tyranny, an end to democracy, an almost
apocalyptic cultural civil war, an unprecedented violation of the Constitution,
and a triumph of partisan injudicious will.  But this case was not Bush v.
Gore.20  Nor was it like a recent string of decisions based on imagined and
manufactured “penumbras” of state sovereign immunity that cut deeply into
Congress’s chosen machinery of civil rights enforcement and labor law
regulation.21  Nor did the decision resemble problematic judicial enforcement
of unenumerated individual rights, as in cases like Roe v. Wade.22  Roper
instead focused on an explicit command and limitation of constitutional text
traceable back in law to principles existing before the Constitution.
Still, the opinion of Justice Kennedy left a lot to be desired.  One liberal
journalist told Jeffrey Rosen of The New Republic and George Washington
University that “ever since Justice Anthony Kennedy . . . styled himself a
judicial statesman, he has become insufferable, out of control, and ‘deserves
to be slapped.’”23  While a defense of Roper also may prove equally
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11, available at http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?pt=0A6ssnI6gzXGUvo7IevhDx%3D%3D.
24. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 184 (2005) (discussing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
25. Id.
26. The constitutionality of the death penalty imposed for juvenile crime has been the
subject of much scholarly attention since the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 543 U.S. 551
(2005).
XXFor arguments in favor of the Roper result, see Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, The Decline
of the Juvenile Death Penalty: Scientific Evidence of Evolving Norms, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 427 (2005) (addressing statistical evidence reflecting juveniles’ lesser culpability
and greater risk of wrongful execution); Richard Heisler, The Kids Are Alright: Roper v.
Simmons and the Juvenile Death Penalty After Atkins v. Virginia, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 25 (2004)
(predicting that Stanford will be overruled because the rationale of the Court in abolishing
executions of the mentally retarded); Kim A. Lechner, Reflections on the Juvenile Death
Penalty: Contravention of Precedent and Public Opinion, 15 IN PUB. INTEREST 113 (1996-
1997) (arguing that the death penalty does not reduce juvenile crime); Youngjae Lee, The
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677 (2005) (criticizing the
constitutional jurisprudence articulating the “proportionality” requirement of the Eighth
Amendment); Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of the
Child?, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 147 (1995) (arguing that the juvenile death penalty is inconsistent
insufferable, I hope to respond to criticism that focused on the way the
majority explained and justified its ruling.  Academic and professional
reaction tended to the view, as expressed by another law professor about
another Kennedy opinion, that Roper “should be celebrated by all who stand
against the endless campaign” for vengeance and retribution in the form of
capital punishment — even against children and adolescents.24  “But in the
main, the actual opinion . . . is not satisfying as a matter of constitutional
interpretation.”25
Because Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion represents the most
comprehensive attack on the Roper decision, his arguments define the issues
best — and most influentially.
To tone down the debate, this article asks the appropriate questions in this
way:
(1) Does the judicial decision to abolish the juvenile death penalty reflect
a principled fidelity to the Constitution, its text, history, and original meaning?
(2) Is the abolition of the juvenile death penalty consistent with a careful,
candid assessment of our nation’s traditions and “evolving standards of
decency”?
(3) Does the nearly universal international condemnation of government
killing as punishment for child-committed crimes matter, when judges decide
what is “cruel and unusual punishment”?
This article’s answer to all three questions is yes — emphatically yes.26
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with the state’s parens patriae duty to protect children by considering their best interests);
Victor L. Strieb, Executing Juvenile Offenders: The Ultimate Denial of Juvenile Justice, 14
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 121 (2003) (predicting the demise of the “centuries-old American
practice of punishing the acts of children with death”); Audra M. Bogdanski, Comment, Relying
on Atkins v. Virginia as Precedent to Find the Juvenile Death Penalty Unconstitutional:
Perpetuating Bad Precedent?, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 603 (2004) (arguing that the statute count is
an inadequate approach to finding a national consensus); Lucy C. Ferguson, Comment, The
Implications of Developmental Cognitive Research on “Evolving Standards of Decency” and
the Imposition of the Death Penalty on Juveniles, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 441 (2004) (arguing in
favor of abolition of juvenile capital punishment based on evolving standards of decency);
Bryan Graff, Comment, Executing Juvenile Offenders: A Reexamination of Stanford v.
Kentucky in Light of Atkins v. Virginia, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 485 (2003) (arguing the
execution of juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment); Mirah A. Horowitz, Note, Kids
Who Kill: A Critique of How the American Legal System Deals with Juveniles Who Commit
Homicide, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2000, at 133, 135 (arguing for abolition of the
juvenile death penalty, with emphasis on data showing "juveniles on death row have a
disproportionate number of social and psychological problems, including unstable and abusive
family backgrounds, drug and alcohol addiction at a very young age, mental illness and brain
damage"); S. Starling Marshall, Comment, “Predictive Justice”?: Simmons v. Roper and the
Possible End of the Juvenile Death Penalty, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2889 (2004) (arguing for a
broader assessment of national traditions, rather than a statute count, to expound the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause); Edmund P. Power, Article, Too Young to Die: The Juvenile
Death Penalty After Atkins v. Virginia, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 93 (2002) (arguing that executing
juvenile offenders is unconstitutional); Nicole A. Saharsky, Note, Consistency as a
Constitutional Value: A Comparative Look at Age in Abortion and Death Penalty
Jurisprudence, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1119 (2001) (arguing the juvenile death penalty is
unconstitutional); Michael J. Spillane, Comment, The Execution of Juvenile Offenders:
Constitutional and International Law Objections, 60 UMKC L. REV. 113 (1991) (arguing that
execution of persons for crime committed under age eighteen violates customary international
law incorporated in constitutional and federal common law); Lawrence A. Vanore, Note, The
Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors: Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of
Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 762 (1986) (arguing “the inherent immaturity and irresponsibility
of youth, as recognized in the law, renders a death penalty for minors excessive in every case”).
XXFor arguments in favor of Stanford and executions for juvenile crime, see Jeffrey M. Banks,
Note, In Re Stanford: Do Evolving Standards of Decency Under Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence Render Capital Punishment Inapposite for Juvenile Offenders?, 48 S.D. L. REV.
327 (2003) (defending Stanford); Warren M. Kato, Comment, The Juvenile Death Penalty, 18
J. JUV. L. 112 (1997) (arguing for the execution of juvenile offenders and for overruling
Thompson). 
27. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861-62
(1989).
I. A Written Constitution and An Evolving Doctrine
In articles and public speeches, Justice Scalia argues against the idea of a
living, evolving constitution.27  He is characteristically witty in his attacks.  To
Scalia, one either believes in law, including a fixed, written constitution, or
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cls. 1-2; id. art. II, § 1, cls. 1-2, 4.
31. Noah Webster, Reply to the Pennsylvania Minority: “America,” DAILY ADVERTISER
(N.Y.), Dec. 31, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 553, 559 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., 1993).
32. Raoul Berger, The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING, 303, 303-04 (Eugene Hickok ed., 1991);
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 231 (1999); Anthony F. Granucci, Nor
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969).
33. For a recent summary of Eighth Amendment doctrine as a “jurisprudential train wreck,”
see Benjamin Wittes, What is “Cruel and Unusual”?, POL’Y REV., Dec. 2005-Jan. 2006, at 15,
15.  
34. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 342 (4th
believes in a fallacy — or something worse.28  He urges interpretation based
on original meaning, and nothing but original meaning.  Every part of the
Constitution is fixed, immutable, and unchangeable except by amendment.29
No one doubts, of course, that this methodology is correct for unambiguous
terms — age limits for public office, length of terms, methods of electing
presidents (in most elections, anyway).30  But other provisions are different.
The real controversy focuses on the open-ended phrases, the clauses with
“evolutionary content.”
A. The Text  
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment is one
such controversial clause; the words are ambiguous.  During the debates on
the Constitution, prior to ratification and the subsequent drafting of a Bill of
Rights, Noah Webster, an advocate of a national constitution and author of
America’s first great dictionary, stated the common sense of the problem:
“[U]nless you can, in every possible instance, previously define the words
excessive and unusual — if you leave the discretion of Congress to define
them on occasion, any restriction of their power by a general indefinite
expression, is a nullity — mere formal nonsense.”31
The apparent meaning of the text is at odds with what some scholars hold
as prevalent understandings of the clause’s language at the time of ratification.
The clause does not refer to torture or barbaric or “sanguinary”
punishments — but those punishments seem to be what the founders had in
mind.32  Nor does the clause plainly state the principle that punishment should
fit the crime — though that is the meaning of the phrase as interpreted by
English Courts in England’s Bill of Rights.33  The word “cruel” connotes not
“extreme” punishments, but “harsh,” “inhumane” methods of criminal
sanction that offend an unspecified moral sense.34  The word “unusual” seems
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/3
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ed. 2000) (defining “cruel” as “[d]isposed to inflict pain or suffering” or “[c]ausing suffering”);
POCKET OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 203 (Della Thompson ed., 8th ed. 1992)
(defining “cruel” as “causing pain or suffering, esp. deliberately” or “harsh, severe”); RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 321 (Laurence Urdang ed., college ed. 1968)
(defining “cruel” as “willfully or knowingly causing pain or distress to others,” or “enjoying the
pain or distress of others,” or “rigid; stern; unrelentingly severe”); WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 273 (1976) (defining “cruel” as “disposed to inflict pain or suffering” or “devoid
of humane feelings” or “causing or conducive to injury, grief, or pain” or “unrelieved by
leniency”).
35. See, e.g, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note
34, at 1505 (defining “unusual” as “[n]ot usual, common, or ordinary”); POCKET OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH, supra note 34, at 1010 (defining “unusual” as
“remarkable”); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 34, at
1442 (defining “unusual” as “not usual, common, or ordinary; . . . exceptional”); WEBSTER’S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1284 (defining “unusual” as “uncommon” or
“rare”).
36. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Smith), quoted
in Granucci, supra note 32, at 842.  The House debate was also discussed in Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243-45, 262-63
(1972).
37. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Livermore),
quoted in Granucci, supra note 32, at 842.
38. Id. at 782-83, quoted in Granucci, supra note 32, at 842. 
to refer to punishments that are “rare,” “freakishly rare,” “unheard of,” or at
least not common or  ordinary.35  The words negate any idea that the framers
intended a fixed meaning: what is “unusual” refers to infrequency at a point
in time — and times change.  It seems reasonable to conclude America wanted
the federal government to be confined to humane and ordinary punishments,
not harsh and rare criminal sanctions. 
B. Origins and Original Meaning  
The framers understood the ambiguities and the potential for change when
Congress included the “cruel and unusual” clause in the Bill of Rights.  One
Representative Smith of South Carolina objected to the words “nor cruel and
unusual punishments” on grounds that “the import of them [is] too
indefinite.”36  Representative Livermore of New Hampshire agreed.
Livermore thought “[t]he clause seems to express a great deal of humanity,”
but he also worried that “it seems to have no meaning in it.”37  He offered a
prophecy — the clause’s meaning might change: “No cruel and unusual
punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains
often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in
future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are
cruel?”38  We know little of how the House as a whole reacted to the warnings
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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39. Id. at 783.
40. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 411 (1968); see also Granucci,
supra note 32, at 840 (“[S]ubsequent formulations, often adopted without debate, indicate that
the cruel and unusual punishments clause was considered constitutional ‘boilerplate.’”).
41. Granucci, supra note 32, at 839.
42. Id. at 840.
43. LEVY, supra note 40, at 410; Granucci, supra note 32, at 844-46 (arguing that the
constitutional ban on excessive punishment can be traced to the Old Testament and other
elements of Western traditions, including “the long standing principle of English law that the
punishment should fit the crime” (quoting AM. BAR FOUND., SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 236
(Richard L. Perry ed., 1959))).  See generally Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad,
Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical
Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV.
783 (1975).
44. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Livermore).
of Representatives Smith and Livermore.  But a “considerable majority” of the
House approved the clause.39  Moreover, we do not know whether Congress
approved the language because of the indefinite meaning, or despite it.
Perhaps it is jarring to our civic and professional faith to read the following:
The history of the writing of the first American bills of rights and
constitutions simply does not bear out the presupposition that the
process was a diligent or systematic one.  Those documents, which
we uncritically exalt, were imitative, deficient, and irrationally
selective.  In the glorious act of framing a social compact
expressive of the supreme law, Americans tended simply to draw
up a random catalogue of rights that seemed to satisfy their urge
for a statement of first principles — or for some of them.  That task
was executed in a disordered fashion that verged on ineptness.40
 The requirement of proportionality was not often discussed, despite
Blackstone and other English authorities.41  But Congress had derived the text
of the “cruel and unusual” clause from George Mason’s Declaration of Rights
in the Virginia Constitution, which, in turn was a verbatim copy of the
prohibition contained in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.42  The words trace
back to England — a foreign jurisdiction after 1776 — and back through the
traditions cherished by Western civilization to the Old Testament.43
And so, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments cannot be
interpreted without careful regard for this nation’s traditions and sense of
decency.  Americans adopted the clause, in all its ambiguity and idealism,
because it “seems to express a great deal of humanity.”44
A candid Justice Scalia is hard pressed to deny the Eighth Amendment has
“evolutionary content,” despite his indignation and contrary suggestions in
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/3
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45. When Scalia discusses the Eighth Amendment, he is more candid than his Roper
footnote mourning the mistaken turn away from original understanding in prior Eighth
Amendment cases.  See Scalia, supra note 27, at 861-62, 864.
46. Id. at 861.
47. Id. at 864.
48. Id.  Hopefully, his confession extends to branding and the formally sanctioned removal
of various other body parts — all punishments known in 1791, and even mentioned explicitly
in the text.  See id. at 861.  But all forms of corporal/physical punishment (except the death
penalty) disappeared in the early years of the republic.  See John Braithwaite, A Future Where
Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1732 (1999)
(stating that corporal punishment completely disappeared in the United States between 1820 and
1970).
49. Scalia, supra note 27, at 864.
50. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Roper.45  In a characteristically thoughtful law review article advocating
“originalism” as the least dangerous of interpretive methods, Scalia allows
that some punishments permitted by previous text and contemporaneous
practices are now unconstitutional.46  He further confesses that “in a crunch,”
he too might “prove a faint-hearted originalist.”47  Sensibly, he admits: “I
cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a
statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.”48  Justice Scalia here admits
that the choice is not between strict textualism-formalism-originalism-or-what-
have-you and unrepentant nonoriginalism.  The debate is instead among those
who know that a particular constitutional provision has “an evolutionary
content.”  In Justice Scalia’s words, he is vigilant for those occasions when
“even if the provision in question has an evolutionary content, there is
inadequate indication that any evolution in social attitudes has occurred.”49
Here we can find the core issue between Justice Scalia and some of his
colleagues.  In an equal protection context, Justice Scalia offered the
following explanation:
[I]n my view the function of this Court is to preserve our society's
values . . . , not to revise them; to prevent backsliding from the
degree of restriction the Constitution imposed upon democratic
government, not to prescribe, on our own authority, progressively
higher degrees.  For that reason it is my view that, whatever
abstract tests we may choose to devise, they cannot supersede —
and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect — those constant
and unbroken national traditions that embody the people's
understanding of ambiguous constitutional texts.50
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51. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring).
52. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Stewart,
Powell, & Stevens, JJ.); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (expanding the
clause beyond its original meaning to ban disproportionate punishment); O’Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (“The whole inhibition is against that which is
excessive . . . .”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 13-14 (1980); Note, What Is
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54, 55 (1910).
53. Roper, 543 U.S. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)
(plurality opinion)).
55. Scalia, supra note 27, at 862.
And so the issue narrows.  It is not whether doctrine evolves, but how — and
how much.51 
C. Precedent 
The Justices have been consistent in rejecting the view that the Eighth
Amendment is a fixed, immutable provision, and have been so for almost a
century before Roper.52  Two undeniable elements of doctrine, well-
established before Roper, deserve emphasis.  First, in Justice O’Connor’s
words:
It is by now beyond serious dispute that the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” is not a static
command.  Its mandate would be little more than a dead letter
today if it barred only those sanctions — like the execution of
children under the age of seven — that civilized society had
already repudiated in 1791.53
Second, the Eighth Amendment poses a different interpretive problem, as
Justice O’Connor also explained: “[B]ecause ‘[t]he basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man,’ the
Amendment ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”54
Justice Scalia admits he hates this phrase, “evolving standards of
decency.”55  He detests it, ridicules it, and pretends it is but a recent notion;
but it is deeply rooted in the doctrine of the Eighth Amendment (his own
plurality opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky excepted).  Still, his own personal,
subjective, individual view is no basis — no legitimate basis — for
overturning established doctrine.
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56. Roper, 543 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 565 (majority opinion).  Justice Kennedy reports, “Five States that allowed the
juvenile death penalty at the time of Stanford have abandoned it in the intervening 15 years —
four through legislative enactments and one through judicial decision.”  Id.  The judicial
decision is State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).  Consistent with his
questionable view that tradition is based only on a statute count, i.e., the actions of legislatures
(and perhaps because state court interpretations are not binding precedent), Justice Scalia
reduces the relevant number to four.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790), reprinted in
2 SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 121 (Francis Canavan ed., Liberty Fund 1999).
59. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 236 (1962).
II. Tradition, Consensus, Realities, and Judicial Care
Justice Kennedy’s approach is easily caricatured.  For that, he probably has
only himself to blame.  As Justice Scalia says:  “Words have no meaning if the
views of less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a national
consensus.”56  Likewise, it is difficult to accept Justice Kennedy’s finding of
a “definite trend” against the juvenile death penalty, based on the changed
views of five states in the last fifteen years since Stanford was decided.57
These facts barely demonstrate a fad.  But there are other, additional reasons
why the Justices put an end to the juvenile death penalty.
There are two ideas lurking behind the Scalia-Kennedy clash.  One is what
counts in Eighth Amendment cases, the other is what counts in the judicial
search for tradition, which reflects Edmund Burke’s argument that peoples
and societies “will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to
their ancestors.”58  Evidence of tradition can serve many purposes, but
whether the judicial function is conservative or the cause is alleged to be
liberal, the Justices must
immerse themselves in the tradition of our society and of kindred
societies that have gone before, in history and in the sediment of
history which is law, and . . . in the thought and the vision of the
philosophers and the poets.  The Justices will then be fit to extract
“fundamental presuppositions” from their deepest selves, but in
fact from the evolving morality of our tradition.59
A. Method  
There is no agreed method and there is considerable criticism that any
method is no more likely to yield rules of law than historical research,
political theory, or philosophical speculation.  Justice Scalia has argued that
only specific traditions will do; general values gleaned from traditions will not
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60. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (upholding
a California statute providing that a child born to a married woman is conclusively presumed
to be a child of the marriage, and the genetic father has no visitation or other parental rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).  Though only one other member of
the court — Chief Justice William Rehnquist — joined this view when written, id. at 112, it is
fair to say that many Eighth Amendment cases — including Scalia’s own plurality opinion in
Stanford v. Kentucky — exemplify a specific tradition test.
61. Id. at 128 n.6.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 875-77 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(rejecting Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, which held that persons committing crimes
under age sixteen ought not to be executed unless the legislature has explicitly set an age limit
on capital punishment allowing such executions).
64. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
do.60  Scalia’s focus is on “the most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”61
Scalia explained:
Because . . . general traditions provide such imprecise guidance,
they permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society’s
views. . . . Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of
leaving judges free to decide as they think best . . . , a rule of law
that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable
tradition is no rule of law at all.62
It is a methodology designed to tame the judicial search for “evolving
standards of decency.”
B. Tradition in Eighth Amendment Analysis  
In Roper, Justice Scalia cares only about statutes.  Indeed, it seems he relies
on a count of state statutes and nothing else.  The technique is designed to
ensure deference to democratic decisions, but it is wholly isolated from a real
assessment of what is “cruel” and what is “unusual.”  In Scalia’s analysis,
what states permit — and what they theoretically might do — is all that
counts.  It matters not whether they have made an explicit decision or an
implicit one.63  It matters not whether they actually use the power that they
explicitly or implicitly preserve.  It matters not what states actually do — or
what juries do.  It matters not that some states bar the death penalty for all,
because those states’ thinking is not specific and targeted to the line-drawing
based on age in the administration of the death penalty.  At various points,
Justice Scalia argues that a reliance on evidence other than the statute count
is “absurd,” “implausible,” contrary to logic, and based on “the flimsiest of
grounds.”64  But he does not examine the whole story:
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/3
2006] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR JUVENILE CRIME 821
65. Id. at 564 (majority opinion).
66. See id. app. A at 580-81; CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TBL. NO. PHC-
T-2, RANKING TABLES FOR STATES: POPULATION IN 2000 AND POPULATION CHANGE FROM 1990
TO 2000 tbl.1 (2001), http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t2/tab01.pdf.
67. Roper, 543 U.S. app. A at 579-80.
68. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reinstating the use of the death penalty after finding capital
punishment permissible under the Constitution).
69. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 561 (majority opinion) (stating that “the last execution of an offender for a crime
committed under the age of 16 had been carried out in 1948").
71. 487 U.S. 815, 859 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Roper, 543 U.S. at 610-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 609.
74. Id. at 611 n.2.
75. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 850 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
! In a majority of states, juvenile executions could not happen — even
before Roper.65
! A total of 58.6% of the American population lives in jurisdictions where
such executions could not occur — before Roper.66  Even in a nation
committed to federalism and the rights of small states to enact different laws,
the population data helps to show why the punishments at issue were highly
“unusual.”
! A majority of the states (with a death penalty) that made explicit
statutory choices for a minimum age, chose age eighteen.67  
! In the states where such executions could happen — they were rare
before Roper. Twenty-four of one thousand executions since the resumption
of the death penalty after Gregg v. Georgia68 were for crimes committed by
persons under age eighteen.69  None were of persons committing crimes under
age sixteen,70 though Justice Scalia was unpersuaded by that fact in Thompson
v. Oklahoma.71
Here we must pause to consider what counts in Justice Scalia’s “objective”
statute count.  He would not count a state that abolishes the death penalty,
because we know nothing about the age limit.72  He would count a state that
permits execution for juvenile crime, even if the state has not set a minimum
age by statute, and even if the state has not in fact ever executed an offender
for juvenile crime.73  Apparently, what the state might do counts more than
what the state does.
What accounts for Scalia’s approach?  If it is logic, it is a strange version.
Almost all states provide for the extension of adult criminal jurisdiction to
fifteen-, sixteen-, or seventeen-year-olds.74  That choice says absolutely
nothing about the justice of the death penalty,75 but is a choice that counts for
Justice Scalia when a comprehensive abolition does not.  The states may
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76. Nicole M. Romine, Note, A Compromised Solution: Balancing the Constitutional
Consequences and the Practical Benefits of Using Juvenile Adjudications for Sentence
Enhancement Purposes, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 113, 128 n.152 (2005) (listing various jurisdictions
where the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, and a sentence, ends at age eighteen).
77. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 822 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (alteration in original).
79. Id.
80. Id.
extend adult jurisdiction because the juvenile justice system isn’t effective.
The states surely understand that if an offender is prosecuted in the juvenile
system, jurisdiction — and a sentence — ends at eighteen.76  To avoid the
obvious injustice of a two-, three-, or four-year sentence for murder, the states
extend jurisdiction — whether or not they retain a death penalty.  Yet Scalia
often dares to use the word “sophistry” to punctuate disagreements with his
colleagues.
Law, logic, constitutional text, and original understanding do not command
this view of history or tradition.  It is Justice Scalia who is subjective and
unpersuasive.  He claims to look for “adequate indication” that society’s views
have evolved, but in fact, he passes over much of the evidence essential to
making that judgment.  He is emphatic, vehement, hard in his rhetoric, and
spiteful in his tone; he fails to show, however, that he is doing anything except
setting a high bar: no tradition informs and illuminates until it is nearly
universal, impossibly specific, and a subject of nearly unanimous consent.
C. The Tradition of Juvenile Justice  
The law says children, adolescents, and juveniles are different, and they
must be treated and judged differently.  Lewis F. Powell, in a dissenting
opinion from a denial of certiorari in his last days on the bench, pushed the
Court to give more categorical protection against capital punishment of
juveniles based on the nation’s traditions of juvenile justice.77  A judicial
conservative reluctant to invent broad principles to restrict legislatures, he
knew the truth of our nation’s traditions of restraint in juvenile justice and the
fact that these cases deal with a “chronological immaturity . . . compounded
by ‘serious emotional problems, . . . a neglectful, sometimes even violent,
family background, . . . [and] mental and emotional development . . . at a level
several years below his chronological age.’”78  For Powell, there was no doubt
of “the relevance of this information to a juvenile defendant’s culpability.”79
Further, even before Roper or Thompson, Powell believed “[t]he Constitution
require[d] that a capital-sentencing system reflect this difference in criminal
responsibility between children and adults.”80
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81. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 n.12 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
82. See generally, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF
ADOLESCENCE (1982).
83. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 222 (4th ed. 2004).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
85. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“Children, by definition, are not
assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves.”).  As a result of this capacity
assumption, the actions of adolescents “cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of
maturity.”  Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion).
86. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116 n.12; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967). 
87. See, e.g., Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 1187 (1970).  All states now set the jurisdictional age limit for their juvenile courts no
lower than age sixteen.  See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM app. B (2d ed. 1994).  For further discussion of the motivation for treating adolescents
differently under the law, see THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME
41 (1967) (“Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous to themselves
and to others.”); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978),
quoted in Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 n.11 (“[A]dolescents, particularly in the early and middle
It would seem obvious to recognize the law’s view that children and
juveniles are different than adults.  Still, it is important to highlight the ways
in which the law reflects this conclusion — its categorical conclusion — that
“[c]hildren have a very special place in life.”81  The law holds that children
and juveniles are less mature, more impulsive, more self-destructive, and less
culpable than adults.
Examples of society’s decision to treat children differently include
limitations on youths’ right to vote, contract, sue or be sued, dispose of
property by will, marry, accept employment, purchase liquor, and drive
vehicles.82  As a matter of law, people generally are not fully responsible until
age eighteen, which is the most common age of majority established in
American law for noncriminal purposes.83  Moreover, the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment establishes the right to vote at age eighteen.84  Additionally,
children and adolescents are considered too immature to judge the criminal
responsibility of accused criminals, and therefore cannot serve on juries, yet
might be put to death for crime based on their supposed supreme
“responsibility.”85  Lastly, the development of separate juvenile justice
systems in every state was a manifest decision that the young are different,
and the law must show restraint in their punishment, treatment, and
rehabilitation.86  Whatever the weaknesses of our ineffective, unfunded, and
uncertain juvenile justice systems, the underlying facts of difference between
childhood and adulthood have never been undermined in law.87
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teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults.  Crimes
committed by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but
they deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their
conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. . . . [Y]outh crime as such is not
exclusively the offender’s fault . . . .”).
88. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16 (footnotes omitted).
89. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion).
90. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608-09 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 609, 616.
92. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16, 117.
93. State v. Maloney, 464 P.2d 793, 803 (Ariz. 1970) (reversing the death sentence of a
In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Court summarized the traditions of the law:
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact.  It is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with
laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier
years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults.88
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the plurality stressed that “[t]he reasons why
juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult
also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible
as that of an adult.”89 
Justice Scalia ridicules all of this, but he does not quite deny it.  Indeed, he
seems to admit the facts, but holds that it is not evidence of tradition or
consensus, or even proof that the punishment at issue is “unusual.”90  It only
means political majorities and juries are doing their jobs.91
D. Unacceptable Likelihoods and the Judicial Role  
There is no doubt that juries often do their job, perhaps more often than not.
Nevertheless, these realities are often lost in a single case.  Why?  The answer
is rage, indignation, and horror at the brutalities of certain cases.  To justify
a death sentence, the prosecution must provoke rage.  Sometimes the horror
is aggravated improperly by prosecutorial conduct; sometimes it is an
authentic and reasonable response to the appalling nature of murder.  Too
often, however, it is permitted by bad defense lawyers who fail to make
arguments about youth and background.
Prior to Thompson, the Court said youth is important, but imposed no age
limits and no procedural limits to insure juries gave careful consideration to
youth as a mitigating factor.92   Rage and passion, by human nature, make
rational, sensitive, and careful assessment of extenuating and mitigating
factors difficult, if not impossible.  “[W]hen a life is at stake, emotionalism
often infects the conduct of the trial itself.”93
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fifteen-year-old convicted of murder.).
94. In some cases, the brutal nature of the crime - or perhaps the inflammatory nature of the
evidence - will often be enough to prevent “a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s
background, character, and crime.”  Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 76 n.5 (1987) (quoting
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). In such tragic cases,
“mere sympathy or emotion,” Brown, 479 U.S. at 545, will all too frequently govern the
outcome of the sentencing proceeding.  When the facts respecting moral guilt of condemned
children and adolescents are collected, as they have been by Amici American Society for
Adolescent Psychiatry and American Orthopsychiatric Association, there is good reason to
condemn the sensitivity, the objectivity, the fairness, and the justice of a case-by-case
assessment of youth as a mitigating circumstance - particularly when the crimes are the most
horrifying.  When a murder is particularly brutal, the reality is that the undeniable tradition of
more careful, more sensitive consideration of youthful offenders cannot be vindicated except
by means of a minimum chronological age.
95. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).
96. Id. at 455. 
97. HORACE, Odes Book III, Ode III, in THE ODES AND EPODES 179 (C.E. Bennett trans.,
1939).  Jefferson’s actual language was a Latin phrase, “civium ardor prava jubentium”--a
phrase from the Roman poet, Horace.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar.
15, 1789), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 942-43 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984);
see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 276 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (expressing the
view that the reason of the public, not passions, should guide government).
98. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, J.J.) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)). 
The only effective means of preventing juvenile executions is an
enforceable principle of restraint, such as a minimum age.94  This was — and
is — a proper concern and function for courts.  The search for principles of
humanity in the Eighth Amendment must be, at least in part, a judicial search.
When Madison proposed the Bill of Rights, he expressed hope that
“independent tribunals of justice w[ould] consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of those rights.”95  In this, he was inspired by his friend,
Thomas Jefferson.  Madison had expressed doubts whether the "paper
barriers" of declared rights would be effective in a republic.96  Jefferson,
writing in Paris during the early days of the French Revolution, replied that
Madison overlooked the legal check that a bill of rights would place in an
independent judiciary, which, Jefferson continued, would be unaffected by
"the frenzy of . . . fellow-citizens bidding what is wrong."97
The Madison-Jefferson correspondence — so central to the birth of the Bill
of Rights — is an early expression of the original understanding, hope, and
trust that the courts’ “essential quality is detachment, founded on
independence.”98  Throughout our history and the achievements and failures
of our legal system:
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99. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 32 (1978).
100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 452, 456 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005)
101. Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., (Jan. 2, 1921), reprinted in Gerald
Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some
Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 770 app. (1975); see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435
U.S. 223 (1978) (drawing a line between five-person and six-person juries for purposes of
unanimity requirement); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (drawing a line between
imprisonment for more than six months and imprisonment for less than six months in
determining right to jury trial); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (drawing a line between
criminal contempts which must be tried to jury and those when need not be so tried, based on
states’ line-drawing, for similarly punished crimes).
102. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
states may “narrow the class of death-eligible defendants in order to decrease “the danger of
arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty”).
It took no violent stretching of democratic theory to suppose an
expectation on the part of the people that, in employing the
criminal sanction, the political branches would abide the judge’s
sense of what was mete and decent in the way of procedure, just as
they abided the discretion of the jury.  And, if the supposition
concerning popular expectations should prove wrong, then the
justification of the judicial function was that criminal
procedure . . . raised questions of elemental justice to the
individual, not of social policy.99
When fundamental rights such as those secured by the Bill of Rights are
endangered by rage, passion, bias, or emotion, one of the principal challenges
of constitutional interpretation is to develop rules that do not “leave the utmost
latitude for evasion.”100  The Supreme Court has found it proper to draw such
lines to protect constitutional values in other contexts.  For example, in the
First Amendment context, the federal courts searched for “qualitative
formula[e], hard, conventional, difficult to evade” in defense of expressive
liberty.101  A minimum chronological age — one consistent with the nation’s
broader traditions of juvenile justice — is but a means to an end of reducing
excessive, rare, freakish, and unjust punishment.102
III. A Decent Judicial Respect for the Opinion of Mankind
A strong case for abolition of the juvenile death penalty rests on American
traditions, the Constitution’s original values, and the Supreme Court’s
distinctive role in this democratic republic.  But because Justice Kennedy also
referred to international patterns of justice, the opinion has been ridiculed,
condemned, and misunderstood.
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103. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
104. For the most part, Justice Scalia does not deny the facts in Kennedy’s argument, only
their relevance.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 608-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In fact, some countries
apparently do execute persons for crimes under age eighteen (though not necessarily persons
classified by law as minors):  Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, all countries
otherwise classified as among “the usual suspects” when human rights violations are reported.
Dana Mulhauser, Price of Progress, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 2, 2005, http://www.tnr.com/doc
print.mhtml?i=w050228&s=mulhauser030205.
105. Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M. 69, c. 36, § 1 (Eng.).
106. Granucci, supra note 32, at 844-46.
107. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
109. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 121 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.).
Justice Scalia must deny, totally and completely, that international
standards are relevant, because they are, if nothing else, clear and
unambiguous.  Justice Kennedy concluded that the “determination that the
death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds
confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in
the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty.”103  At least, it is proof that the practice is “unusual.”104
There are many factors weighing against the objection to international law
as irrelevant and immaterial.  Some factors deserve mention because they
might not be remembered in a judicial opinion or legal brief.  First, the cruel
and unusual clause was borrowed verbatim from England’s bill of rights.105
Second, the history of the idea traces through the history of western
civilization.106  Third, the Declaration of Independence — the document
announcing America’s separation from the old world — acknowledged a duty
to maintain a “decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind.”107  Fourth, the text
of the Constitution permits, or even requires, Congress to create jurisdictions
and laws to punish “Offenses against the Law of Nations.”108
If there is a judicial conservatism that still respects precedent, there are
many precedents that use foreign authority for purposes other than interpreting
treaties and enforcing commercial agreements.  For example, in the early years
of the republic, the great Chief Justice John Marshall admitted and proclaimed
the moral injustice of slavery, but ordered a return of a cargo of 280 Africans
to Spanish and Portugese consuls, because:
Whatever might be the answer of a moralist to this question, a
jurist must search for its legal solution, in those principles of action
which are sanctioned by the usages, the national acts, and the
general assent, of that portion of the world of which he considers
himself as a part . . . .109
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110. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 595 (1841). 
111. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604-05 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
112. President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on
Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/
Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03CivilRights06111963.htm.
Over a decade later, Marshall’s close friend and colleague Justice Joseph
Story spoke for a Court holding that kidnapped Africans on the schooner
Amistad enjoyed rights of self-defense and could not be punished as mutineers
or pirates based on “eternal principles of justice and international law.”110
In any case, it is Justice O’Connor, not Justice Scalia, who offers an
authoritative and reliable description of the past judicial use of international
authority in an Eighth Amendment case:
Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently
referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its
assessment of evolving standards of decency.  This inquiry reflects
the special character of the Eighth Amendment, which, as the
Court has long held, draws its meaning directly from the maturing
values of civilized society.  Obviously, American law is distinctive
in many respects, not least where the specific provisions of our
Constitution and the history of its exposition so dictate.  But this
Nation’s evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is
neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the
values prevailing in other countries.  On the contrary, we should
not be surprised to find congruence between domestic and
international values, especially where the international community
has reached clear agreement--expressed in international law or in
the domestic laws of individual countries--that a particular form of
punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights.  At
least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature can
serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine
American consensus.111
When considering international opinion — and deciding whether to
consider it — American judges need to remember the common sense and
prudence of the matter in light of our nation’s boast to be leader of the free
world and its frequent efforts to chastise other nations that trample basic
principles of human dignity.  “We preach freedom around the world,”
President Kennedy said, “and we mean it . . . .”112  But as an unprecedented
amici brief on behalf of Nobel Peace Prize winners argued in Roper,
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113. Brief for President James Earl Carter, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 29, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636446.
114. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
115. Harry A. Blackmun, Thompson v. Oklahoma: Case File (unpublished working papers,
on file with Library of Congress).
116. See, e.g., Eric. R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the
Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791 (2005); G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea
of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1144, 1149, 1180-82 (2005).
117. See James Boyle, A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age?, 50 DUKE L.J. 5, 15
n.35 (2005) (citing Scalia’s majority opinion in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997),
as an attempt to restore a portion of the “Constitution-in-exile”); Richard A. Posner, Foreword:
A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 50-51 (2005) (noting that Scalia and Thomas oppose
Kennedy’s “living constitution”).  For an introduction to the concept of the “Constitution-in-
By continuing to execute child offenders in violation of
international norms, the United States is not just leaving itself open
to charges of hypocrisy, but also is endangering the rights of many
around the world.  Countries whose human rights records are
criticized by the United States have no incentive to improve their
records when the United States fails to meet the most fundamental,
base-line standards.113
Responding to those who grumble about the relevance of foreign law within
America, the Nobel laureates added: “Norms of international law, such as the
prohibitions on genocide, slavery and torture, are not merely ‘foreign moods,
fads, or fashions’ that we are seeking to ‘impose on Americans.’  They protect
human dignity across all of our national frontiers.”114  It is an objective that
coincides with the origins and original values of the Eighth Amendment.
Conclusion
According to notes of Justice Harry Blackmun, during the court conference
on Thompson v. Oklahoma, both Justices O’Connor and Scalia stated that they
personally oppose the juvenile death penalty, and Justice O’Connor said she’d
vote against the death penalty if she was a legislator.115  Despite cynicism and
heated rhetoric, particularly among politicians, this is not a debate over good
and evil, good faith, or patriotism.
It is a debate — an honest one — about judicial role.
As many commentators have noted, “strict construction” and “judicial
conservatism” now reflect a constitutional “fundamentalism” pressing the
theory of “originalism.”116  Justice Scalia is a voice on the Court for those who
seek to restore a “constitution-in-exile,” to move back toward the Constitution
of 1789, 1791, or 1868.117  Often, theirs is a virtue of consistency.  But there
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exile,” see Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, REGULATION, Winter 1995, at 83
(reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/
reg18n1/reg18n1-readings.html.
118. Even Justice Scalia would agree with this proposition.  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule
of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1989) (stating Scalia’s preference for
general principles in light of his preference for originalism).
119. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
120. Id. at 995-96 (Bork, J., concurring).  Judge Bork included much of his Ollman analysis
in his book.  See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 167-69 (1990).
is another view of judicial restraint — a tradition-bound vision more like the
conservatism of Burke, articulated by Robert Bork.
Judge Bork often denied that he embraced a rigid or doctrinaire originalism.
And many agree that the most one can expect from looking to original
understanding is an underlying premise or a first principle.118  Judge Bork put
an edge to that argument in a concurring opinion that responded to an opinion
by Judge Scalia on libel and the First Amendment, when both men served on
the D.C. Circuit.119  Bork defended one of William Brennan’s great cases, New
York Times v. Sullivan:
Judges given stewardship of a constitutional provision . . . whose
core is known but whose outer reach and contours are ill-defined,
face the never-ending task of discerning the meaning of the
provision from one case to the next.  There would be little need for
judges--and certainly no office for a philosophy of judging--if the
boundaries of every constitutional provision were self-evident.
They are not. . . . [I]t is the task of the judge in this generation to
discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world
they knew, apply to the world we know.  The world changes in
which unchanging values find their application.
. . . 
We must never hesitate to apply old values to new
circumstances . . . . The important thing, the ultimate
consideration, is the constitutional freedom that is given into our
keeping.  A judge who refuses to see new threats to an established
constitutional value, and hence provides a crabbed interpretation
that robs a provision of its full, fair and reasonable meaning, fails
in his judicial duty.120
The meaning and potential of this approach are revealed in the fact that
Justice Brennan joined a plurality opinion by Justice Stevens that quoted this
passage, shortly after the Senate rejected Judge Bork’s nomination to the
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121. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (plurality opinion).
122. Id.
Supreme Court.121  The case addressed an issue of paramount concern to
Justice Brennan: the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of
the Eighth Amendment as applied to capital punishment of juveniles.122
A justice whose passion is to resurrect a nineteenth-century version of
constitutional law, who desires to turn back on history without memory of sins
and crimes for which this country paid dearly, who promises to pretend that
we can figure out what men of the eighteenth and nineteenth century thought
about future constitutional issues, is not a conservative.  Such a judge is not
a “strict constructionist” when enforcing — or refusing to enforce — a
constitutional limitation with an undeniable evolutionary content.  He or she
is a radical — ready and willing to turn a blind eye toward the meaning of our
nation’s change and growth, to detest our nation’s growing, maturing,
evolving standards of liberty, equality, and decency.  Whether he or she
intends it, a judge so committed and so dedicated does not merely preserve
values; he or she revises them.  It is another form of constitutional
“backsliding” that does violence to our country’s very real constitutional
progress and to our country’s very real claim to be in the vanguard of the fight
for human rights.
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